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Abstract: 
 
Two main political and economic paradigms have framed the Social Europe so far. 
The first one has consisted in the (German) “ordoliberalism”, which has played a key 
role in structuring the foundations of the European Community as well as those of the 
Monetary Union. The other and more recent one is the so called “Social Investment 
Strategy” ” recently endorsed by the European Commission. Both normative 
frameworks have been also at the heart of the responses formulated at the European 
level to the euro crisis. Therefore, they have had decisive consequences on the 
current social situation in the Economic and Monetary Union.  
This paper uses a theoretical and methodological framework, that combine 
Weltanschauungen (or doxai), principles and norms, for analyzing models of 
representations of social facts. This grid of analysis is used to understand what has 
happened to the Social Europe in the wake of the current Eurozone crisis and to 
formulate some alternatives.  
. 
 The collapse of the financial markets, which happened 2007-2008 in the United 
States, has meanwhile turned into the worst social crisis ever experienced by several 
Member States of the Economic and Monetary Union. What are the social 
representations and driving forces at the root of this downward spiral? Two political 
and economic main paradigms have framed the Social Europe so far, its design and its 
historical trajectory. The first paradigm has consisted in the (German) 
“ordoliberalism”, which has played a key role in structuring the foundations of the 
European Community as well as those of the Monetary Union. The other and more 
recent one is the so called Social Investment Strategy. Beyond national and regime 
specifics, this approach, which in fact first appeared in the 1960s and then 
(re)emerged in the 1990s, has in the meantime become the official doctrine of the 
European Commission. Both approaches have complementarily been used by the 
European Council as well as by the European Commission to elaborate the responses 
to the crisis of the Eurozone. Therefore, both normative frameworks have had 
decisive consequences on the current social situation in the Economic and Monetary 
Union.  
This paper aims at using a theoretical and methodological framework, which has 
been formerly introduced in various researches (Salles, 2007; Salles and Colletis, 
2013), that combine Weltanschauungen (or doxai), principles and norms, for 
analyzing models of representations of social realities. This grid of analysis will be 
used to understand what has happened to the Social Europe in the wake of the 
current Eurozone crisis. We will first explain the methodology used. Secondly, the 
main part of the paper will investigate and explain the content of the two relevant key 
paradigms, their implications in terms of institutions and workings within the 
Economic and Monetary Union and, therefore, their consequences for the Social 
Europe. The third part of this paper will analyze the roles played by the 
ordoliberalism and the social investment approach as a response to the crisis; it will 
also stress their fundamental weaknesses and deficiencies. The final part will then 
present some elements for an alternative representation of a “Social Europe”. 
 
 
1. The DPN method to analyze public policy and to build alternative policy 
 
The double objective of this paper is, using the Doxa-Principles-Norms 
methodology (Salles, 2007), first, to analyze the discourse on the Social Europe and 
the way it is materialized in concrete devices and, second, to build an alternative 
discourse and the policies to implement it. 
Our perspective is that of an engineering of the modes of government, of policy in 
its broadest sense.  In a twofold way, with the methodological tool, the Doxa-Princips-
Norms model (Salles, 2007) is aimed at analyzing of how the dominant discourse on 
social Europe is embodied within the "machinery of power"1, but also, in a reverse 
path, at revealing of how the specific devices, often presented as being merely 
techniques, are in fact carriers of deep and largely hidden representations. Using the 
same methodological tool, it is possible to offer an alternative discourse on Social 
Europe, as well as the ways to make it operational. 
Our approach is that of a critical research in the sense of Neuman (2000) (in 
opposition to positivist and interpretive researches): 
                
1 A rding to the term used by Michel Foucault (2001a). 
 “[Critical approach] goes beyond surface illusions to reveal underlying structures and 
conflicts of social relations as a way to empower people to improve the social world”. 
The DPN method distinguishes three levels in the organization of power. The first 
level, the more concrete – and often the only visible – is the level of the norms that 
govern the economic and social life2. The second level, essential even if often ignored, 
is the level of principles that inspire those norms and establish their conceptual and 
methodological framework. Finally, the third level is that of the worldviews – explicit 
and implicit – the doxai that are at the basis of the principles and norms. We will have 
a closer look at each level later on in this part.  
This structure in three levels, from the most specific and concrete to the most 
general and abstract, is commonly used in the engineering fields as in the 
management of enterprise and organization or the information systems (IS). Anthony 
(1965) thus distinguishes three types of processes from the most general to the most 
operational: the strategic planning that establishes the objectives of the organization; 
the management control, that oversees that the resources are used efficiently in order 
to achieve the objectives; and the operational control that supervises the realization 
of the production. In a similar way, these categories as been used and refined by 
several researchers. Among them Ansoff (1989) classifies the organizational 
decisions in three groups: the strategic decisions that define the kind of relation 
between the organization and its external environment (its mission, its raison d'être); 
the administrative decisions that establish the internal structure of the organization 
(relations of authority, distribution of responsibility); and the operational decisions 
that aim at making the process of resources transformation efficient.  
For one of the elements involved in the governing of organizations, the information 
systems (IS), a three levels modeling (Sprinkle et al., 2010) is commonly used in 
computer engineering, going from the most generic to the most specific3. A database, 
for example, includes three levels of modeling. The first level is that of the meta-
model, which consists of generic concepts available to build/create the models (e.g. 
the generic concepts of entity and relationship between entities). At the second level, 
there are the models created on the basis of the meta-model’s elements; these are 
(empty) structures which represent (by drastically reducing the complexity) the 
elements of the world deemed to belong to the organization (for example, for a 
business the model of objects involved in product selling: customer, product, order, 
invoice…). Finally, at the third level, the produced models correspond to the data 
organized and structured as asserted by the model (e.g., information about a real 
customer, his orders, etc., as used by those for whom the system is intended). 
Outside of the engineering fields, Foucault (2001b) proposes three levels of 
analysis of power (even if they do not have a general/specific relation):  
“(…) it seems to me that it is necessary to differentiate the power relationships as a strategic 
game between the liberties (...) and the states of domination, which are what is usually called 
the (political) power. And, between the two, between the games of power and the states of 
domination, you have the governmental technologies, embellishing this term with a very broad 
meaning (...).The analysis of these techniques is necessary, because very often it is through this 
kind of techniques that the states of domination are established and maintained. In my analysis 
of (political) power, there are theses three levels: strategic relationships, the techniques of 
government and the states of domination” (our translation). 
                                        
2 In this context, the term ‘norm’ is used in the sense of rules and regulations (ISO/CEI, 2004) and not as it is 
commonly used in sociology. 
3 It is noteworthy that the approaches represented by the models or MDA (Model Driven Architecture) add a 
fourth level, the meta-meta-level. 
 From an institutionalist perspective, Schmidt (2008) also distinguishes three levels 
in the discourse: policies, programs and public philosophies: 
„The first level encompasses the specific policies or “policy solutions” proposed by policy 
makers. The second level encompasses the more general programs that underpin the policy 
ideas. (…) These programmatic ideas are at a more basic level than the policy ideas because they 
define the problems to be solved by such policies; the issues to be considered; the goals to be 
achieved; the norms, methods, and instruments to be applied; and the ideals that frame the 
more immediate policy ideas proposed to solve any given problem. At an even more basic level 
are the “public philosophies” (…) - worldviews or Weltanschauung that undergird the policies 
and programs with organizing ideas, values, and principles of knowledge and society (Schmidt, 
2008, p. 306). 
As stressed by Schmidt, in contrast to the fields of IT and management where the 
most abstract level is explicit, in this context the level of philosophy often remains 
hidden.  
Indeed, many authors have analyzed the hidden and non-debated role of the 
worldviews in the instruments of government. Berry (1983) shows how in the 
organizations the managerial instruments impose a structure to the reality, implicitly 
determining the choices and the behaviors of unaware organization’s members. In 
the context of public institutions, Lascoumes and Le Galès (2005) show how behind 
the instruments of public action there are non-debated political choices. In a similar 
vein, Lorrain (2005) defines social technologies – such as legal categories and ratios 
of financial equilibrium – as the ‘invisible pilots of public action’. 
Le Gales (2005) identifies the philosophy which establishes the instruments set in 
place to restructure the state in the UK, which are being promoted as being mere 
techniques: 
“(...) the English utilitarian tradition, in the logic of a hyper rationalization of the world (...), 
[represents] the belief in a world of individuals motivated by the quest for their selfish interests”. 
 
The DPN model is consistent with the presented approaches, although being 
distinctly different. Like the engineering for management and for information 
systems, but also like Schmidt (2008) and Foucault (2001b), DPN identifies three 
levels in the devices of government, designated here as doxai, principles and norms. 
In accordance with the work of Berry (1983) or of Lascoumes and Le Gales (2005), 
DPN recognizes in each political action, each socio-technical system or each standard 
the expression of a world view, which remains mostly implicit, deeply concealed 
within them. These researchers, however, retain only two levels in their analyses, on 
the one hand that of the "management tools" (Berry, 1983), of the "management 
arrangements" (Maugeri, 2007; Metzger, 2010), or of the instruments of public action 
(Lascoumes and Gales, 2005), and on the other hand that of the world visions, the 
"philosophies" in accordance with/in the terminology of Schmidt (2008). 
DPN, in contrast, distinguishes an intermediate level between the "philosophies" 
(doxai) and norms, the middle level of the principles. We present below the three 
levels of DPN in more detail. 
The first level consists of general representations that are expressed in different 
formalization degrees: from confused and non-structured opinions to well-
established ideology. In the case of public policies, the doxai involve paradigmatic 
choices on the economy and the social, on the role of the state or of EU institutions. 
For example, human work can be interpreted as a cost – that should be minimized – 
or as the sole source of value. Similarly, social protection can be considered an 
expenditure (source of public deficit) or as a productive resource (Mathieu and 
Sterdyniak, 2008).  
 The doxai are too general and too abstract to use them to organize a social system. 
Hence, some more structured instruments are necessary. This is the function of the 
principles that specify the concepts, the items and the methods that allow the 
attainment of the objective identified at the level of doxa. The principles give a 
structure to the organization and to its actions. They can be defined as machines 
producing norms. The principles may be explicit or implicit. They include the 
language – both in the sense of dominant discourse and of dominant terminology – 
social conventions, legal categories, organizational methods (and the way in which 
decisions are made), methods that define indicators of evaluation, etc. Some examples 
in the context of the UE are: the use of benchmarking and of best practices and the 
way in which social indicators and statistics at European level are defined.  
The norms are the most operational and visible devices of power. Unlike doxai and 
certain types of principles (such as conventions), the norms are visible, formalized or 
formalisable. They are presented as purely technical, derived from the search for 
efficiency and thus excluded from the political debate. They take the form of laws, 
regulations, standards, best practices, criteria, indicators and statistics. The minimum 
wage, the objective of employment rate and the percentage of public debt on the GDP 
are some examples of norms. 
 
2. Two main paradigms for understanding the features and functioning of 
the Social Europe. 
 
As explained in the introduction, two main paradigms have been playing a key role 
by being used as a response to the Eurozone crisis. For both paradigms we will use 
the already explained grid of analysis for distinguishing the representations, the 
principles and the norms. 
 
2.1 Ordoliberalism: the competitive order. 
 
Ordoliberalism4 is a school of thought, represented by a group of academic 
economists and lawyers, that emerged in the late 1920s in Germany and which is 
mainly interested in finding out how modern industrialized economies can be 
“organized through an order which is both economically efficient and humanly 
acceptable” (Eucken, 1942/1959, p.48, our translation). Its representatives tried to 
find a “third way” between the old (Manchester) liberalism and the socialist planed 
economy. The decisive element in the ordoliberal tradition is the freedom, which can 
only be kept save within the framework of a competitive market economy. Its final 
purpose consists in the idea that only a competitive order can guaranty not only the 
efficiency of economic processes, but may also hinder the concentration of (economic 
and political) power5. This competitive order has to be established and promoted by 
the state. 
This school of thought needs to be understood within the prevailing historical 
context of that time: the Weimarer republic (with its hyperinflation, great depression, 
policy of cartels), the centrally planned economy in the UDSSR, then the Nazi ideology 
                                        
4 The term “ordoliberalism” was in fact first used in a 1950 issue of the review ORDO. Before the War, the 
ordoliberals may have referred to themselves mostly as “neoliberals” – a term which is said to have been 
coined in 1938 by Alexander Rüstow.  
5 “Competition as an instrument of disempowerment,” wrote Böhm (cited by Wördersfer, 2011, p.190). 
 and regime6 and eventually the post-war reconstruction. Concerning the intellectual 
context, the ordoliberalism has to be understood with regard to its critics of the – 
then declining – “historical school of economics” after the Methodenstreit (Labrousse, 
2006) and its proximity to and differences from the Austrian neo-liberalism (von 
Mises, Hayek), but also before the context of a widening opening towards the 
international mainstream, which eventually  resulted in the diffusion of the 
neoclassical approaches and later on in the emerging of Keynesianism (Rieter and 
Schmolz, 1993)7. 
Ordoliberalism is nevertheless a heterogeneous set of ideas, although practically 
all the leading Ordoliberals joined the Mont Pèlerin society (Ptak, 2009). Some 
studies distinguish between three different groups: The core group of German 
ordoliberalism, that is ordoliberalism « senso stricto » (Wörsdörfer, 2011), is being 
identified as the Freiburger Schule, founded in the 1930s at the University of Freiburg 
in Germany by the economist Walter Eucken (1891-1950), and by the two jurists 
Franz Böhm (1895-1977) and Hans Großmann-Doerth (1894-1944). In a broader 
sense, the term ordoliberalism also embraces a second “sociologic” trend (Pfak, 
2004), represented by Alexander Rüstow and Wilhelm Röpke and finally by the group 
of “practitioners” led by Ludwig Erhard, Minister of economy from 1949 to 1963, who 
then became Chancellor, seconded by Alfred Müller-Almark, who himself was an 
offspring and a central figure of the Kölner Schule der Nationalökonomie, and who was 
to become a theoretician of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft. The analysis developed here 
will mostly refer to the work of Walter Eucken (1939/1989), the key figure of this 
school of thought. 
 
Ordoliberalis:  a “Weltanschauung”  
 
The intellectual sources of influence on Eucken are diverse. For Wörsdörfer 
(2011), at the heart of Eucken’s concept and discourse on liberty is the (Kantian) 
term of autonomy. According to Eucken, the main threat to liberty is threefold: it 
derives from the private power of producers, from the power of social groups within 
a society and from the government. That is why this liberty protected by the law is so 
important: “Just as for the state governed by rule of law, the competitive order should 
create a framework, in which the free pursuit of the individual is limited by the 
sphere of liberty of another, thus creating a balanced liberty between humans. In 
reality, the will for competition is closely linked to the will for liberty”, (Eucken, 1949, 
p.27, translated by Wörsdörfer, 2011, p.197). But this liberty is not only a “negative” 
one; it requires material (see further) and mental conditions. From this perspective 
Christian values have concomitantly influenced the ordoliberal conservatism (Röpke, 
Rüstow) and its emphasis on the sociocultural foundations of individuals in the 
market economy.  
Ordoliberalism, as formulated by W. Eucken, is based on a concept of economic 
order promoted and guaranteed by the State, as opposed to planned economy and 
laisser-faire. In this respect, ordoliberalism departs from the classical liberal 
                                        
6 The relationship towards the national socialist regime remainded ambiguous. Some ordoliberals, like Röpke 
and Rüstow, were forced to emigrate, while others, like Eucken, became open opponents of the regime and 
stood up against the instrumentalisation of the University (by Heideger in Freiburg). Other right-wing liberal 
economists had accomodated themsselves to the regime, at least until 1942 (Ptak, 2009). 
7 On the genesis of ordoliberalism see Rieter and Schmolz (1993), Ptak (2004), Wörsdörfer (2011). 
 
 approach that emphasizes self-regulation of the market as well as “spontaneous 
order”, which evoked strong criticism, notably from Rüstow (Denord, 2008). 
According to the ordoliberal view perspective, it is the State’s task to organise 
competitive markets by providing a policy framework - “Ordnungspolitik” - for the 
implementation of this concept in society as well as the safeguarding mechanisms for 
these principles.  
Eucken repeatedly stressed the importance of a “strong State”, which is 
constrained by a political constitution and could therefore stand above social conflicts 
for the creation and preservation of the competitive order (Rieter and Schmolz, 
1993)8. This central role of competition in ordoliberalism can primarily be explained 
by the opposition it manifested to the regulations of the Weimar Republic on cartels 
(Kartelverordnung from 1923), and more generally, by the idea that laissez-faire leads 
to the emergence of particular powers that cannot be reconciled with the general 
interest. In this sense, the competitive order may be viewed as an approach to 
prevent the exploitation of the most disenfranchised members of society through 
economic powers. 
 
Ordnungspolitik: constitutional and regulative principles of the competitive order 
 
It is important to identify with Eucken’s ideas the framework for governmental 
action and processes. The structure is established by the Ordnungspolitik as an 
instrument of the State, whereas the process is defined through private initiative, the 
free forces of the markets. This Ordnungspolitik means that the state has to 
implement a policy, aimed at creating a sound and secure framework within which 
the markets can operate. “The main role of the state is to set the stage, to outline the 
framework conditions, as these are decisive for the development of economic activity. 
The fundamental task of the state can be described as ‘rule-setting’: to set the rules 
for economic processes, monitor compliance with them, and punish infringements” 
(Maes 2002, p. 7). It is about setting the rules of the game, to reinsert the market in 
institutional structures by using the tools of regulatory interventionism and 
competition policy. This active role of the state to frame and to boost competition is 
one of the most distinctive features of the ordoliberalism in comparison to the neo-
liberalism (Schnyder and Siems, 2013). State regulation must take into account the 
interdependency of Orders, as well as the fact that economic intervention can also 
have an impact on the remaining social structures. 
If there is a need for the State to intervene in order to ensure that the conditions 
for maintaining the competitive order are met, then the later cannot exist without a 
legal framework (Drexl 2011). Eucken defines two clusters of principles: the 
constitutional principles9 and the regulatory principles. “The ordoliberalism of the 
Freiburg School starts from the very premise that the market order is a constitutional 
order, that it is defined by its institutional framework and, as such, subject to (explicit 
or implicit) constitutional choice” (Vanberg, 2011, p.5). The basic principles of 
constitutional economics aim at avoiding all forms of arbitrary of abuse of private or 
public powers (Deschamps, 2013) as well as all unprincipled discretionary approach 
to economic policy. They consist in setting up an operational price system, enabling 
                                        
8 Ptak (2004) points out the fact that Rüstow and Müller-Armarck referred affirmatively to Carl Schmitt’s 
theory of the state. 
9  About the fundaments of the economic constitution and the relevance of this concept for the European 
Union see Drexl (2011). 
 perfect competition, ensuring the primacy of monetary policy and price stability, 
open markets, private ownership of the means of production, the principle of liability, 
freedom of contract in a competitive process, as well as the steadiness and constancy 
of economic policy. Monetary stability plays a crucial role in this context, “as inflation 
damages the steering function of the price mechanism and creates uncertainty” (Maes 
2002, p. 8). Money creation is an instability factor for the economy and also a 
fluctuation factor, because money supply is managed by specific interest groups 
(private banks, trade unions, the State) (Dehay, 1995). In order to establish a stable 
monetary order meant to serve public interest, the independence of the central bank 
should be firmly anchored in the Constitution.  
Equally important are the rules for sanctions against any transgression of price 
stability. This idea was put into practice in 1948 during the monetary reform and laid 
down in the Bundesbank Act which was passed in 1957. The anti-trust legislation, 
which became law in 1958, was the final step on the path of market economy 
according to the principles of ordoliberalism (von der Groeben 1979). 
The state has thus to set the institutional framework in which the economic 
activities take place (Spielregel), but not to drive the economic process (Spielzüge). 
However these constitutional principles are strengthened by regulatory principles 
(regulierende Prinzipien) meant to ensure that the competitive order will be upheld in 
the long run. These principles include combating monopolies and cartels, income 
policy, corrective measures to mitigate negative external effects. The role of the State 
consists in intervening each time, the economy departs from the preset model or each 
time reality reveals deficiencies, hindering the functioning of this economic model 
(Dehay, 1995, p.35). Infringement of the competitive rules must be sanctioned by the 
State.  Numerous norms of public policy are derived from these principles (see the 
table 1). 
 
Ordoliberalism and “Social Market Economy” 
 
Beyond the recognition of the state’s role, one other peculiarity of German 
ordoliberalism’s contribution to neoliberalism – which deserves attention in the 
present context – was “a dedicated effort to resolve what the German ordoliberals 
themselves conceived as ‘the social question’” (Ptak, 2009, p.102). The embedded 
character of the market economy in the society and the “interdependence of 
(economic, cultural, societal) orders” (Eucken) explain this particular attention paid 
to the social question. Yet, there is no unified ordoliberal school of thought regarding 
social policy and more broadly regarding the “Social Market Economy”. The meaning 
of the term soziale Marktwirtschaft itself has been a controversial issue for decades. 
 Table 1: Ordoliberalism  
Normative Framework: ordoliberalism 
Doxa/Representations/ 
Worldviews 
Principles/Paradigms Norms/Policies 
- Final purpose: only a 
competitive economic order can 
guaranty freedom, efficiency and 
well-being 
- Moral philosophy of reference: 
Free markets (if shaped by a 
legal-institutional framework) 
serve the public good. 
- Conception of freedom: 
(Eucken) individual liberty 
consists in the Kantian notion of 
autonomy  
- Relationship between economic 
and social spheres: 
Interdependences of economic, 
cultural and social spheres 
- Inequality/Philosophy of social 
justice: Market processes which 
stick to the ordoliberal principles 
are fair; income formation 
should be subject of competition 
rules.  
- Conception of government: a 
“strong state” has to set up the 
rules of the game (constitutional 
and regulative principles) but 
does not intervene onto 
economic processes.  
- Conception of Europe: market-
oriented system (four liberties), 
which has to include rules that 
limit the freedom of intervention 
of member states  
- Concept of social Europe (art. 
136 TEC): well functioning 
(common) markets will favor 
working conditions and standard 
of living for workers 
- Causes of the current crisis:  
Excess of public spending, 
deficit and public debt, lack of 
competitiveness and structural 
reform in the south EU countries 
- Constitutional principles: 
private property, functioning  
price system, freedom of 
contract, primacy of 
monetary order, liability, 
constancy of economic 
policy 
- Regulatory principles: 
combating monopolies and 
cartels, income policy, 
corrective measures to 
mitigate negative external 
effects 
- Language:  
Ordnungspolitik, rules of 
competition,  highly 
competitive social market 
economy, free movement of 
workers, services and capital; 
Defizitsünder (deficit 
sinners), tightening of 
binding rules, structural 
reform, sanctions.  
- Conventions: efficiency of 
the well organized market-
order.  
- Organization of the UE 
negative integration, removal 
of all obstacles to free market 
and competition, weak EU-
Institutions 
- Definitions of social 
exclusion : 
market solutions but the state 
may intervene in case of 
negative externalities. Access 
to the market (minimum 
income). 
- Risks targeted by social 
policy: Unemployment, 
poverty 
 
- Economic policy: 
independency of the central 
bank, price stability, sound 
public finance, competition 
policy, 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit 
(competitiveness) 
- Instruments and main fields 
of social policy and 
redistribution: well 
functioning economic order 
and “special social policy” 
where the markets fail. 
Progressive income tax, 
which should not damage 
the investment  
- Norms: “growth friendly” 
fiscal policy, long term 
sustainability of welfare 
state and pensions system, 
tighten the eligibility 
criteria and control for the 
allocation of benefits, 
reduce the (too) high tax 
wedge, implement labour 
market reforms and reduce 
disincentive to work. 
Strengthen competition by 
lowering barriers and 
reducing 
(regulative)restrictions 
- Indicators:  
inflation’s target, % of 
GDP for current public 
deficit, structural budget 
balance, % of GDP ceiling 
for General Government 
gross debt,  
- Social indicators: GDP per 
head, Unemployment rate, 
poverty rate 
 
 
 
This is due to the fact that there are at least three different approaches to this 
notion: The ordoliberal approach of thought that developed immediately after World 
War II, followed by an evolutionistic conception developed by Müller-Armack, who 
coined the term even though he was a latecomer at the margin of the traditional 
ordoliberalism, and lastly, the concept associated with the German economic and 
social “miracle”. 
 The position of Eucken on this topic is not perfectly comprehensive because of his 
sudden death, which hindered him to finish Grundzüge and the part devoted to the 
social policy. Eucken does not offer a unified concept of justice. He rather conceived 
social policy within the framework of order (Eucken 1942/1959, XVI)10. Market 
processes which stick to the ordoliberal principles are fair. That explains why the 
competitive order is so important: Not only because of its efficiency, but also because 
it offers the optimal solution to the soziale Frage. Eucken stresses that there is no 
policy without repercussions on the social question (soziale Frage). Allocation and 
redistribution are always linked (Eucken 1942/1959, XVII), and the competitive 
order ensures that the formation of income will be subjected to the right rules of the 
game. This is the key issue. Yet, because competition policy is not sufficient to solve 
all of the problems, other aspects need to be considered concerning the “special social 
policy areas”, which reach beyond the order issue and the commutative justice, as 
defended by Hayek (Wörderfer, 2001, p.206-237). Still, social policy always remains 
subjected to the subsidiarity principle, and the limits of redistribution are being 
pointed out. All these social policy measures have to be implemented in accordance 
with the efficiency of the market. The Welfare state (Wohlfahrtstaat) is viewed 
negatively, as an emanation of paternalism, etatism and corporatism. By blunting the 
will to perform well and by therefore leading to a reduced capacity for innovation, the 
welfare state has a significant cost, all the more, as it can also undermine(s) self-
responsibility in general. This is the conclusion drawn by Ludwig Ehrard: “The 
concepts free and social are congruent (...); the freer an economy is the more social it 
is and the greater will be the macroeconomic utility created”11. This statement clearly 
showcases the approach adopted in the “social programme” of the Rome Treaty (see 
Annex 1). 
In conclusion, a strict distinction has to be made between the ordoliberal heritage 
as found in the European treaties and the entrenched components, those institutional 
complementarities that are specific to Germany’s post-war economic and social 
system (Streeck 2009). Paradoxically, the EMU has become an unexpected channel to 
reintroduce the ordoliberal principles in Germany through the back door. 
 
2.2. The Social Investment (Third Way) approach.  
 
The Sozialinvestionen approach appeared in the 1960s in Germany in the context 
of the “second phase of the social market economy” (Müller-Armarck) and the 
debates on the renewal of the social policy (Sozialenquête-Kommission, 1966; 
Sanmann, 1970) especially influenced by some ordoliberals (Müller-Armarck, 1960 
and 1962 ; v. Nell-Breuning, 1970). The main issue was already a shift of priority in 
the area of social policy in favour of preventive services (benefits in kind) and social 
investments compared to benefits paid in case of loss of income or more broadly 
compared to “corrective factors”. This new orientation toward a more “preventive, 
                                        
10 In the Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, Eucken writes: “One of the main intentions of this book 
was to make again clear that social policy should not be viewed as an appendix to the rest of economic 
policy, but that it has to be considered first and foremost as an issue of economic order’s policy 
(Wirtschaftsordnungspolitik) (…) There is nothing that doesn’t concern social issues (…). Within the 
framework of a competitive economy, it means above all: achieving its basic principle, namely the 
creation of a functioning price system of perfect competition” (1942/1959, p.179-180, our translation). 
 
11  Ludwig Erhard (Wirken und Reden, Ludwisburg, 1966, p.320) cited by H. Tietmeyer (1999, p.6). 
  
forward-looking, growth friendly and active” social policy (Widmaier, 1970) focused 
on the areas of preventive health, education, skills requirement over the life cycle and 
care. It was already bound to the issue of new indicators. 
The idea that social policy has to become a productive factor which enhances 
growth and employment reappeared in the 1990s. In this framework, the state has to 
enable citizens to care for themselves rather than caring for them (Häusermann and 
Palier, 2008). It is possible to distinguish at least two kinds of social investment 
school of thought (Morel et al., 2012). The first can be defined as social-democratic 
and is mainly realized in the Nordic countries and especially in Sweden. This involves 
the combination of protection and enabling policies because security is considered a 
precondition for the good functioning of activation. The second version of social 
investment that has become dominant at the European level is based on the ideology 
of the Third Way, developed by Anthony Giddens (1998) and sees security as an 
obstacle to activation. We will focus on this latter version because of its influence on 
the European discourse and policy-making: Since the launch in 2000 of the Lisbon 
Strategy, which was aimed at boosting growth and jobs, notably through the 
measures which invest in people's capacities and provide equal opportunities, the EU 
has adopted this policy orientation. It has meanwhile become the “official” strategy of 
the EU Commission in the field of social Europe (e.g. Europe 2020, Social Investment 
Package) – see Morel (2013) and below.  
 
The social investment worldview  
 
As Ebert (2012, p. 143) observes, the Third Way ideology is characterized by the 
following assumptions: the recognition that there is no alternative system to organize 
society beyond capitalism; the role of the civil society in providing welfare (together 
with the state and the market); the formula “no rights without responsibilities”; the 
supply-side economic policy with focus on investment in human capital; the focus on 
the equality of opportunities rather than redistribution and outcomes equality; the 
economic globalization as a given. Furthermore, this version of the social investment 
approach can be defined as an ideological synthesis between neoliberalism and a new 
social-democracy (Ferrera, 2012).  
From neoliberalism, the social investment approach derives the critique to the 
traditional welfare state. This is considered responsible of producing perverse 
incentives that may cause social problems such as long-term unemployment. Indeed, 
providing excessive passive benefits impedes individuals to act responsibly (e.g. 
generous unemployment benefits are an obstacle to the active search for a job). In 
this sense, social rights should become conditional upon the take-up of 
responsibilities. The new paradigm is thus supported by three ideas: “Making work 
pay”, a new role for the individual, and a mix between rights and duties (Vielle and 
col., 2005). In his book "The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy", Anthony 
Giddens introduced the notion of social investment as a normative concept (Giddens, 
1998). He called for a “new partnership” in the assignment of the welfare function to 
families, markets and states and challenged the state to develop an entrepreneurial 
culture. The goal was to “shift the responsibility between risks and security involved 
in the welfare state, to develop a society of responsible risks takers” (1998: 100).  
From the social-democratic ideology, the social investment derives the concern for 
social equality. However, this is defined in a new manner following the formula: 
‘equality as inclusion’ (in the labour market), given that the aim is not to achieve 
 substantial equality of outcomes but rather to equalize opportunities. Therefore, in 
the social investment paradigm, social justice is defined as a) the equality of 
opportunities (precondition); b) the contribution principle, which states that a 
person’s position in the society should reflect her greater contribution to the society’s 
welfare (Ebert, 2012, p. 157). Hence, inequality is judged not on the basis of its extent 
– as it was in the traditional welfare state –but rather on how it emerges: inequalities 
that emerge after having equalized opportunities are just because they reflect 
individuals’ different contributions to society. Thus, the problem of justice is limited 
to that of equalizing the chances of participating in the market: once this is 
guaranteed, then the market results are just. In contrast to the social-democratic 
ideology that is based on the assumption that the structures of a market economy 
should be reformed to achieve social justice (e.g. de-commodification of labour), in 
the social investment the rules of the market game are accepted and no longer put in 
question, the question of justice is concentrated to the opportunity to participate in 
the game, with given rules (Ibid.). 
A parallel implication of this is that social policy and economic policy are to be 
integrated. In particular, social policy is subordinated to economic policy. The shift in 
the emphasis from consumption-based and maintenance-oriented programs to social 
services that contribute directly to economic development is conceived as an answer 
to the neo-liberal argument that social spending being wasteful and a source of 
dependency (Mindgley, 1999). The social investment seeks to enhance social and 
human capital as well as capacities to participate in the productive economy. It 
presumes to offer an alternative perspective to redistribution: social programs 
should be investment oriented, enhance economic participation and make a positive 
contribution to growth (Midgley and Sherraden, 2000). Thus, the objective of the 
social investment strategy is to maximize the employment rate in order to achieve 
economic growth and social inclusion. From this perspective, social policy is not 
considered as a cost that should be kept to a minimum – as it is in neoliberalism – but 
rather as a productive investment that contributes to economic growth that becomes 
the final objective and the source of welfare state legitimacy. 
 
The language of the new social risks and of structural reforms 
 
The social investment has to be understood within the framework of the issues 
raised by the socio-economic transformations that have taken place during the past 
three to four decades: Deindustrialization and the tertiarisation of employment, 
massive entry of women into the labour force, increased instability of family 
structures, de-standardization of employment (Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Bonoli, 2007), 
aging population and its implications for social care and new challenges posed by 
change to the labour markets and competition in a globalized knowledge based 
economy. Accordingly, new social risks have appeared: low or obsolete skill, inability 
to combine motherhood and child rearing with paid employment, sole parenthood 
and child poverty, atypical career patterns and insufficient social security coverage. 
Traditionally the welfare state has had to deal with the risk of lack of income due to 
life-risk (unemployment, old age, etc.) whereas the social investment regime 
considers the lack of skills and the risk of exclusion (long term poverty, out-dated 
skills), the family breakdowns or being called on for care for an elderly relative as 
more important. Instead of the redistributive welfare state paradigm, the social 
investment state (Dingeldey, 2008: 220, Giddens, 1998) aims at redeploying public 
 spending from passive social transfers to investments in education and training, 
labour market activation measures, promotion of lifelong learning and other 
measures to reconcile work and family. The populations targeted for intervention via 
investment have also changed. In a context of “post-industrial cleavages” (Bonoli, 
2001), the welfare state can no longer be only a “welfare state for (mostly male) older 
worker and older people in general” but has to prevent risks. 
As already mentioned, the idea of the active social state is first rooted in the neo-
liberal critique of the welfare state that the latter is cumbersome, badly designed and 
incorporates perverse incentive structures. The OECD took up this critique in its 
influential report of 1994 (OECD, 1994) that stressed the opposition between passive 
and active social expenses. Furthermore, the old welfare state is criticized because, 
being based on the assumption of family stability and the gender division of labor 
(male breadwinner model), it preserved gender inequality. Moreover, it was focused 
on the redistribution of resources, thus neglecting other barriers to equality such as 
discrimination against women, disabled and migrants. Also, this redistribution took 
place in form of passive benefits, thus overlooking the agency potential of the 
beneficiaries. Thus, old welfare state interventions were standardized and incapable 
of providing individualized support. Finally, despite its aiming at equality, the welfare 
state has proved to be also source of social inequalities between insiders and 
outsiders (Emmenegger et al., 2012) and incapable of protecting against the new 
social risks (family instability, discontinuous working lives, structural unemployment 
and atypical employment).  
Thus, while the neoliberal solution to the “welfare state problem” would be the 
reduction of social expenditures to a minimum, the social investment solution is 
identified with a new welfare state focused on activation policies that provide people 
with the instruments for self-help, following the liberal ideal of the self-sufficient 
citizen. This clearly involves individual responsibility, which transforms social 
citizenship from a status to a contract, conditional to the participation in the labour 
market (Borghi, 2011). Hence, the social investment approach points to the need of 
reforming the welfare state rather than suppressing it. In this context, a crucial role is 
played by the concept of structural reform. Structural reforms are presented as 
necessary steps to adapt to the changed social environment and the emergence of the 
new social risks. In this way, welfare state reform is presented as a technical problem 
for which experts should find a technical solution rather than a political task.  
 
Social investment policies and indicators 
 
As outlined above, the main point of the social investment is the “recalibration” of 
welfare states expenditures from “unproductive”, “passive” and “reparative” 
instruments towards “active” and “preventive” ones. In other words, in opposition to 
the classical welfare state, the social investment state does not aim at repairing the 
social damages caused by the market but rather it provides citizens with the skills 
and competences which allow them to be competitive in the knowledge economy and 
in a globalized world. This is why it is central for this approach the investment in 
human capital through education, training programs and lifelong learning. 
Investment in skills is seen as the solution to a long list of problems such as social 
exclusion and unemployment. From this perspective, some important indicators of 
successful policies implemented at national level are low levels of NEETs (Not in 
 Employment, Education or Training) and of school dropouts, good results in the 
Programme for International Student Assessment and so on.    
Furthermore, in the social investment policies enabling the work/family balance 
are important in order to allow women to enter and stay in the labour market. 
Particular importance is given to a large and high quality childcare provision. On one 
hand this should increase women’s participation in the labour market. On the other 
hand this allows intervening in a crucial phase of children’s development in which it 
is still possible to break the intergenerational transmission of social disadvantage 
(Ferrera, 2010). Here some important indicators are the availability of childcare 
services and the female employment rate.  
More generally, in the social investment framework the overall objective of social 
policy becomes the maximization of employment rate. This is seen as the solution to 
both the social exclusion problem and the economic unsustainability of the welfare 
state. 
 
Table 2: Social Investment 
Normative Framework: Social Investment 
Doxa/Representations/ Worldviews Principles/Paradigms Norms/Policies 
- Final purpose: economic growth 
through inclusion (maximization of 
employment rate) and social cohesion 
(order); “make the people fit for the 
market”. 
- Moral philosophy of reference: 
utilitarianism, Third Way (Giddens): 
equality of opportunities 
(precondition) and then market justice. 
- Conception of freedom: limited 
positive freedom (people are 
empowered but they have to use this 
freedom to participate in the labor 
market). 
- Relationship between economic and 
social spheres: society is a machinery 
of performance and thus subordinated 
to the economy. 
- Individual vs. Collective 
responsibilities: Individual and 
collective framework (intensity 
depending on the kind of welfare: 
workfare (more individualistic) vs. 
learnfare (more collectivistic)). Cause 
of unemployment: lack of skills. 
- Inequality/Philosophy of social 
justice: inequality has a positive 
function because it provides the right 
incentives. However, the equality of 
opportunity is required because it is 
efficient (undistorted competition).  
- Conception of government: the 
government should adopt the market 
logic and intervene only when there is 
a payoff, a profitable investment and 
- Constitutional principles: 
private property, free price 
system, freedom of contract, 
primacy of monetary policy, 
steadiness and constancy of 
economic policy. 
- Regulatory principles: 
combating monopolies and 
cartels, income policy, 
corrective measures, 
investment in skills.  
- Language:  
Structural reforms, aiming at a 
competitive and inclusive 
market economy through the 
development of a flexible and 
skilled labor force.  
Activation, rather than 
protection, is the new task for 
the welfare state. 
New social risks: family 
instability, discontinuous 
working lives and atypical 
employment, structural 
unemployment and long-term 
poverty, lack of skills. 
- Conventions: efficiency of the 
well-organized market order. 
- Organization of the EU: 
negative integration, removal 
of all obstacles to free market 
and competition. At EU level: 
development of socioeconomic 
objectives, benchmarking using 
indicators of performance, 
control on structural reform and 
- Economic policy: 
independency of the central 
bank, price stability, sound 
public finance, competition 
policy, competitiveness 
achieved through structural 
reforms (e.g. flexible labor 
market) and investment in 
human capital.   
- Instruments and main fields 
of social policy and 
redistribution: social policy 
is an economic investment 
(e.g. investment in human 
capital in order to develop 
a skilled labor force; 
work/life balance policies 
in order to allow women 
entering and staying in the 
labor market; interruption 
of the intergenerational 
transmission of social 
disadvantage through high-
quality childcare services). 
Progressive income tax, 
which should not damage 
the investment.  
- Macroeconomic Indicators: 
inflation’s target (2%), 3% 
of GDP for current public 
deficit, 60% of GDP for 
public debt.  
- Social indicators: GDP per 
head, employment rate, 
poverty rate, school drop-
out rate, NEETs, young 
not for social reasons. It should enable 
citizens to care for themselves rather 
than caring for them. 
- Conception of Europe: market-
oriented system, a competitive “smart, 
sustainable and inclusive” market 
economy.  
- Concept of social Europe social 
inclusion through employment. 
- Causes of the current crisis: Inefficient 
public spending: need for recalibration 
(less spending, more productive 
investment); labor market rigidity, 
unskilled labor force, lack of 
activating and work/life balance 
policies. 
on the use of the public budget 
(Lisbon Startegy, Europe 2020, 
European Semester).  
- Definitions of social exclusion : 
exclusion from the labour 
market 
- Risks targeted by social policy: 
new social risks (e.g. lack of 
skills/outdated skills; long term 
poverty, family breakdowns). 
and women employment 
rates, research and 
development investment 
rate, PISA indicators on the 
level of skills, employment 
protection as indicator of 
labor market rigidity, 
spending on passive 
welfare policies vs. 
investment in activating 
policies.  
 
3. Responses to the crisis: toward a market-oriented European social model. 
 
In order to put into perspective the policies implemented in response to the crisis 
in the Eurozone, we will examine how the ordoliberal tradition has shaped the 
measures implemented under the leadership of the German government12. Against 
this background, the European Commission has launched a “Social Investment 
Package”13, which is supposed to provide “a policy framework for redirecting 
Member States’[social] policies, where needed, towards investment throughout life, 
with a view  to ensuring the adequacy and sustainability of budgets for social policies 
and for the government and private sector as whole” (European Commission, 2013a). 
We will show that the ordoliberal crisis management has lead toward a market-
oriented European social model. The social investment strategy has supported this 
path.   
 
3.1 The long shadow of the ordoliberalism14  
 
Even before the crisis the governance-by-rules approach did not pass the test of 
reality in the UEM (Pisani-Ferry, 2006). However, the policy response to the 
Eurozone crisis under the leadership of the Germany could be deemed essentially 
ordoliberal, that is inspired by an approach, using primarily more binding rules for 
public finances as well as reinforced competition between national spaces of labour 
allocation. A prerequisite for competitiveness is the implementation of structural 
reforms (labour market and social protection) aiming at implementing “internal 
devaluation”.  
Several extern and intern factors may explain the role of the German government 
as a veto player and as the agenda setter (Young, 2013). Germany is the dominant 
economic power in the eurozone due to its economic weight and performances since 
2006. The weakening of French economy also appears as one of the relevant factors 
at the European level. Moreover, the Maastricht funding compromise has shaped the 
                                        
12 The annex gives an overview on the ordoliberal imprint on the treaties of Rome and Maastricht.  
13 The communication “Towards Social Investment for Growth and Cohesion” was accompanied by a 
Commission Recommendation on “Investing in Children: breaking the cycle of disadvantage” and a 
series of Staff Working Documents (Barbier, 2013a). Together they form the “Social Investment 
Package”. 
14 Title borrowed from Dulian and Guérot (2012) 
 eurozone according to the German monetary doctrine (Aglietta, 2012; annex of this 
paper). Yet, whether the emphasis on stability culture has provided a valuable 
resource for securing Merkel’s government objectives within the Eurozone, it has 
above all satisfied the requirements of domestic politics and institutions (Lechevalier 
2011; Bulmer, 2014; Young, 2014). 
However, governance reform in the Eurozone has translated into five sets of 
measures: the “Six-Pack” reforms (November 2011), which includes the European 
Semester, the Euro-plus Pack, the Fiscal Treaty and the “Two-Pack” reforms. This new 
regulation focuses on the following three problem areas: tightening the binding rules 
of fiscal policy, readjusting the macroeconomic imbalances and implementing 
structural reforms.  
  
Stylized overview of the EU fiscal rules 
Enforcement mechanism Fiscal rule 
Preventive arm of the SGP Medium-Term Objective (MTO) for the structural GG budget 
balance 
 Improve the structural budget balance by 0.5 percentage point 
of GDP if MTO not met 
 If a member state deviates from MTO, the Commission can 
propose to apply a sanction (interest bearing deposit); decision 
shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides by 
a qualified majority to reject the Commission’s recommendation 
within 10 days 
 Benchmark for expenditure to grow in line with trend GDP 
Corrective arm of the SGP 3% of GDP ceiling for the general government (GG) deficit 
 60% of GDP ceiling for the GG gross debt 
 Reduce debt by 1/20th of excess over 60% ceiling 
 A non-interest deposit of up to 0.2% of GDP can be required from 
a country with an excessive deficit a already subject to an 
interest deposit or if non-compliance is “particularly serious” 
“Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance (”Fiscal Compact”) 
GG structural budget balance as MTO 
 Improve structural budget balance by 0.5 percentage point of 
GDP if MTO 
not met 
Note: in italic the “new requirements” 
 
The ordoliberal strategy: toward a market-oriented European social model. 
 
The German government has opted for an ordoliberal approach to crisis, based on 
binding rules on public finances and structural reforms aiming at boosting the 
competitiveness of economies. Using already existing rules and combining them with 
new limitations (“Six-Pack”, “Fiscal compact”, “Two-Pack”) the public finances of the 
member states are now submitted to a wide range of constraints: absolute deficit not 
exceeding 3% of GDP, 0.5 % of GDP structural deficit, debt ratio to be curbed down to 
60% of GDP, rules on economic growth and spending. It is difficult to know with 
certainty, which of these rules will provide the main constraint. Simulations run by 
the OECD show that in the future, the Medium Terms Objective (structural deficit of 
0.5% of GDP) will almost always be the binding rule, except for few countries highly 
indebted like Italy and Portugal. Moreover, the revision of the preventive Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) includes for the first time a path of expenditure, which will be 
 expected to grow below the medium-term growth rate of potential GDP15. From an 
ordoliberal point of view, what would be regarded as the salient element is the 
possibility to levy sanctions (monetary fines) against member states in case of non-
compliance with the rules. Sanctions can now be taken earlier than previously16 and 
their use has been simplified by the reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV) 
procedure17. The non-implementation of the fiscal rule (“debt break”) included in the 
Fiscal compact was set to be immediately sanctioned by the European Court of Justice 
at the request of one or more contracting parties. At the same time access to loans 
under the European Stability Mechanism was made dependent to the ratification of 
the Fiscal Pact by the member states concerned. This strategy is supposed to prevent 
moral hazard behaviours from member states and to restore the confidence of the 
markets. In conformity with the ordoliberal approach, the German government has 
blamed too benevolent rules for the failure of the Growth and Stability Pact. A body of 
rules has been established, which is supposed to be quasi-automatically enforced. 
Efforts to have national fiscal policies monitored by the European Commission have 
been backed by the new “European Semester”. The main aim was to reinforce the ex-
ante coordination of fiscal policy with an agreement on the time sequence. 
The “Six-Pack” has extended the scope of macro-economic surveillance with a new 
procedure to correct imbalances in line with the propositions of the Van Rompuy 
Task Force. A macroeconomic imbalance procedure was introduced as a surveillance 
mechanism that aims at preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances within 
the EU. It relies on an alert system that uses a scoreboard of indicators and in-depth 
country studies, binding rules in the form of a new Excessive Imbalance Procedure 
(EIP), and enforcement in the form of financial sanctions for Eurozone member states 
that do not comply with the – asymmetric – recommendations. 
This approach raises many issues. The new rules have durably and negatively 
impacted the economic growth. Up to now public debt in percentage of GDP has not 
been reduced in any country of the Eurozone – except in Germany. Whereas the 
constitutional rule in Germany had allowed for a deficit up to the level of public 
investment until the introduction 2009 of the Schuldenbremse (debt break), the new 
rule imposes that public investment should be financed by current revenues. These 
rules abate even more not only the current growth as shown by the recent studies on 
fiscal multipliers (Batini at al. 2012), but also the “growth potential” (Aglietta, 2012). 
Moreover Wypolsz (2012) has demonstrated that rules are never able to cover all 
contingencies and may therefore become “suboptimal”. Thus, this approach means 
that the member states are deprived of part of their budgetary sovereignty without 
compensation. In fact, it was only possible to save the Euro thanks to the heterodox 
strategy lead by the European Central Bank, despite the prevailing ordoliberal 
principles and norms. 
As opposed to responses based uniquely on public finances, procedures centred 
around macroeconomic imbalances, as put forward by the Commission despite the 
                                        
15  Article 5 of the Regulation N°1466/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 20111 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies. 
16  A fine of up to 0.2% of GDP can be decided by the Council acting under Article 126 (8) of the EU 
Treaty already with the report of an excessive deficit (Stage 3 of EDP), if the Member State has 
already been convicted as part of the preventive arm of the SGP to an interest bearing deposit or if 
non-compliance to SGP is “particularly serious”.  
17  On the critic of fines, see : Sachverständigen p. 135 
 reluctant attitude of the German government, have the advantage of taking into 
consideration the root causes of the current crisis. However, the choice of indicators, 
as well as the asymmetric character of the procedure used to overcome internal 
disparities within the Eurozone are biased: All member states are invited to follow 
the policy implemented in Germany under the agenda 2010, aiming at enhancing 
competitiveness by cutting down the real costs of labour (wages and social benefits). 
In the absence of possible readjustment measures on parity, the European 
governing bodies have increased pressure on wages and public spending. The rule on 
the extension of public spending, the criteria for cutting down public debt and the 
MTO on structural deficit has contributed to undermine long-term economic growth 
and to pressurise the welfare state. Before the crisis, the Open Method of 
Coordination (MOC) in employment policy and social inclusion was unable to correct 
the asymmetry between market-creating and market-correcting policies in the EU. 
The new governance has heightened the asymmetry during the crisis, even marking a 
new phase where market-correcting measures tend to become more and more 
abolished. This new governance by focusing on budgetary issues and supply-side 
reform strategies express a definitive shift of priorities. The strengthening of the rules 
for central monitoring (a fortiori for countries who had to sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the “Troika”), increasingly lead to “a sort of codified ‘right path’ 
on a supranational level”, forcing all member states to converge toward a “liberal 
European Social Model”, which is created “exclusively from the standpoint of the 
coordination of economic policies” (Pochet and Degryse, 2013, p. 113). 
Without any doubt, this ideology has been supported by a number of actors and 
interests at the European level (e.g. ECB, economic and finance ministers, DG Ecfin), 
who have interpreted the crisis as an opportunity to achieve the project of procedural 
governance and the recalibration of the social models (Degryse, Jepsen, Pochet, 
2013). Yet it is also linked to the central role the German economy has played in the 
wake of the crisis and can be mainly explained by the “long shadow of ordoliberalism” 
(Dulien and Guérot, 2012). 
 
An interim assessment of the social situation in the Eurozone 
 
The social situation in most of the Eurozone countries has become really worrying. 
Unemployment in the Euro area has jumped from 11.5 million (representing a rate of 
7.6% of the labor force) at the beginning of 2008 to 19.3 million (12.1%) at the end of 
2013 – a rise of two thirds. Long term unemployment becomes more and more 
entrenched, especially unemployment among young people (more than half of the 
labor force in Spain, Portugal and Greece). Even though the relationship between 
economic growth and employment rate varies according to the country in question, a 
stable pattern emerges within the Eurozone: The youngest cohort has the strongest 
exposure to the business cycle. Moreover, in Italy, Spain, Greece, Ireland, one out of 
five youths aged 15 to 24 is not in education, employment, or training, (Eichhorst and 
al., 2013). The rise in youth unemployment has been accompanied by deteriorating 
working conditions, as reflected by a significant increase in the percentage of 
temporary and especially part time jobs (Da Paz Campos Lima and Kahanec, 2013). 
The evolution of total employment is even more significant: at the end of 2013, the 
level of employment within the Eurozone (without Germany), was still 7 percentage 
points under its mark from before the crisis (-12 points of percentage in Ireland, -13 
in Portugal, -18 in Spain, and -21 in Greece).  
 Critical assessment of the main aspects – inclusive their democratic character – of 
labour law reforms implemented in the EU-countries within four main areas 
(working time, atypical employment, employment protection, industrial relations and 
collective bargaining), whether proposed by the EU under the umbrella of the 
“Troïka” or on behalf of the members states has been made (Clauwaert and 
Schömann, 2012). The depth of these measures and their social consequences are 
unprecedented and affect the heart of national employment regulations. In several 
cases, the recourse to emergency procedures has led to derogations from collective 
agreements and to decentralization of collective bargaining, which violates ILO 
conventions and/or even the provisions offered by the European treaties. Yet this 
“profound weakening” of fundamental social rights runs the risk of endangering the 
European project as a whole. The ability of the jurisprudence, including those of 
constitutional courts, to defend the superiority of constitutionally protected human 
rights principles over budgetary measures has remained limited to some rare cases 
(Latvia, Portugal and Lithuania) (European Council, 2013, p.28). 
The growing pressure put on wages and collective bargaining deserves special 
attention because wage policies are explicitly excluded from the (shared) competency 
of the Union. In spite of that, the EU addressed twelve member states with country 
specific recommendations concerning the areas of wage and collective bargaining (i.e. 
wage increases, wage-setting systems, changing of indexation rules) in 2011/2012 
(Schulten, 2013). The same can be said for the social protection: In accordance with 
the new governance framework and especially with the Euro-Plus Pact, pensions and 
other social benefits have been turned into key variables to be adjusted in order to 
reduce public expenditure. 
 
3.2 Response to the crisis: the role of the SIS 
 
What have been the main responses of the EU Commission to the crisis of Social 
Europe so far? In its main communication on this topic (European Commission, 
2013b) the Commission emphasizes three key issues: “a better coordinating and 
monitoring employment and social policies as part of the European Semester 
process”, “enhanced solidarity and action on employment and (cross border) labour 
mobility” within the EU, and “strengthened social dialogue”.  
The first issue endorses the Europe 2020 strategy, which marks above all a deeper 
embedding of social and employment policy coordination in the context of the 
European Semester’s overall economic strategy as well as the shrinking of social 
policies to the reduction of poverty. It also fits in with a “new understanding of social 
policy as a productive factor to enable the individual to live with and within the 
market and not to correct and regulate misallocations”. In this context the 
Commission’s document also mentions the “Social Investment Package” from 
February 2013 (European Commission, 2013a) as well as the “Youth Employment 
Package” from December 2012.  “The Social Investment Package provides guidance to 
reach the Europe 2020 targets by establishing a link between social policies, the 
reforms as recommended in the European Semester to reach Europe 2020 targets 
and the relevant EU funds (EC 2013a, p.3). Thus the social investment approach is 
clearly jointed and subordinated to the new governance of the Eurozone.  
However the discourse on SIS remains ambiguous when endorsed by the EU 
Commission. In the main working document published (2013a), the new discourse on 
social protection mainly focuses on investment and pays little attention to other 
 functions like those of redistribution and stabilization – which are however 
mentioned – or to the political and the collective dimension of the topic. The 
proposed SIS paradigm tends to neglect social policies that are designed to counter 
social risks or situations that are difficult to cover by activation policies. Moreover, 
the proposed agenda and the evaluation method used prioritize explicitly targeted, 
conditional and temporary programs, which cannot be considered as an alternative to 
the budgetary restraint and the retrenchment policy imposed in countries most 
affected by the crisis (Barbier , 2013). But not only the instrumental use but the social 
investment strategy itself has to be put into question. This approach suffers several 
weaknesses and stalemates.  
1) The preventive nature of the social investment interventions is welcomed from 
a social justice perspective. Indeed, intervening “too late” has not only economic but 
also human costs. Still, the construction of a fictitious trade-off between the 
preventive and the reparative welfare state is problematic from a social justice 
perspective. In contrast to what is often argued by supporters of the social 
investment, the ‘new social risks’ (such as lack of skills) cumulate on the old ones 
(such as unemployment); no substitution is taking place between the two kinds of 
risks. This means that the new welfare state needs to have policy instruments both 
against the old and the new social risks rather than shifting resources away from 
policies addressing old social risks towards policies addressing new ones 
(Allmendinger, 2009).  
The final aim of social policy in the social investment is not to promote justice but 
rather to increase economic competiveness. In fact, the idea behind social investment 
is to have an economic return on social policy. As Morel et al. (2012) put it: “social or 
humanitarian rationale for social policy has been replaced by an economic rationale’ 
(p. 16). As Jenson and Saint-Martin (2003, p.92): An investment model implies that 
social expenditures should have a payoff, a return on investment. Investments are 
generally undertaken to make profits’. 
2) As already seen, in the social investment paradigm, social justice is reduced to 
a) the equality of opportunities (precondition); b) the contribution principle, which 
states that a person’s position in the society should reflect her greater contribution to 
the society’s welfare (Ebert, 2012, p. 157). This doxa raises several issues. Fist, 
equality of opportunities and the contribution principle are incompatible. Indeed, 
since socioeconomic inequalities are the most important determinants of inequalities 
of opportunities, redistribution of resources is required in order to achieve the 
equality of chances (Solga, 2012). Both opportunities and merits are unobservable so 
that it becomes impossible to distinguish exactly between inequality originated from 
unequal opportunities and those from unequal merits (also because outcomes are 
influenced by luck, natural talents and other factors beyond individual control)18. 
Second, social justice always involves a vision of what constitutes a good human life 
so that only few people would agree that the sole source of human value should 
repose on the contribution to society. The market cannot define alone the 
‘contribution to society’. The market does not objectively evaluate the contributions 
according to their economic meaning; rather, their evaluation is always related to the 
actors’ purchasing power and thus ultimately depends on the distribution of income. 
(Ebert, 2012). Like for the ordoliberalism, in the perspective of the social investment, 
                                        
18 This issue, while marginal in the traditional welfare state where the judgement on inequality was focused 
on its intensity independently on the factor causing it, becomes central in the new paradigm where the merit 
is the very unit of measure in evaluating the fairness of inequalities. 
 the sole true injustice is the exclusion from participation in the market. Furthermore, 
the causes of this exclusion are not identified with market failures requiring 
structural interventions but rather with deficits of the individuals who are excluded 
and with the traditional welfare state and the distorted incentives that it creates. This 
clearly involves individual responsibility, thus transforming social citizenship from a 
status to a contract, conditional to the participation in the labour market (Borghi, 
2011). This is justified using the notion of reciprocity and finds its concrete 
application in the use of conditionality on social benefits. As Ben-Ishai (2012) notes, 
the logic of reciprocity may require some kinds of conditionality on benefits in order 
not to undermine the spirit of solidarity on which welfare institutions depend. It 
seems particularly cruel to accord priority to responsibilities over rights precisely for 
those people who already feel victims of the system and at the margins of society. 
However, this is the direct consequence of elevating the market – ‘where the 
economic stronger dominates the weaker’ – to ‘the ideal model for human beings 
living together’ (Ebert, 2012, p. 204). Hence, in the Third Way ideology the tension 
existing between the market and social justice is denied by arguing that ‘economic 
prosperity and social justice are two sides of the same coin’ (Prescott, 2004, cited in 
Davies, 2012, p. 8). Thus, it seems that the objective of equality of opportunity for the 
social investment is not really an issue of social justice but rather a way of improving 
market efficiency through the reduction of the distortions in the competition.  
In short, social policy is no longer a means to protect society from the market, to 
correct the market in order to meet social needs and the social justice objective. 
Rather, social policies should become means capable of influencing people´s 
behaviour in order to make them adaptable to the needs of the market and to include 
in it as many people as possible. This can be seen from the goal at European level of 
increasing the employment rate that has substituted that of fighting unemployment 
(Salais, 2006). 
3) The anthropological conception of the social investment involves the 
‘capitalization of the sense of life’ (Perilleux, 2005, our translation), by which 
individuals consider their own life and relationships as a capital (human capital, 
social capital, emotional capital…). This is the result of the extension of the worries on 
the employability to all life phases and over the whole life spheres. 
For example, the stress on the importance of investing in education tends to 
instrumentalize children. As Myles and Quadagno (1999) explicitly state: ‘children 
matter because human capital formation matters’ (cited in Jenson and Saint-Martin, 
2003, p. 88). Thus, children are ‘citizen-workers of the future’ rather than ‘citizen-
children’ of the present; ‘becomings’ rather than ‘beings’ so that childhood and ‘the 
child qua child, including the child as a right-bearer’, tend to disappear (Lister, 2003, 
p. 433). Furthermore, if children are seen to ‘matter instrumentally rather than 
existentially’ investment in them makes sense only in the presence of a payoff, giving 
no room for ‘expenditure which merely contributes to the well-being or enjoyment of 
children as children’ (Polakow, 1993, p. 101, cited in Lister, 2003). In particular, ‘it is 
the future worker-citizen more than the democratic-citizen who is the prime asset of 
the social investment state’ (Lister, 2003, p. 433) so that learning is reduced to ‘an 
economic rather than an educational process’ (Fairclouch, 2000, p. 75, cited in Lister, 
2003).  
In this sense, policies aiming at the inclusion in the labour market at any cost can 
be defined as ‘illiberal social policies’ (King, 1999). Hence, while classical social policy 
aimed at de-commodification, distributing welfare according to need regardless of 
 individuals’ market performance, in the many possible kinds of activation (Bifulco et 
al., 2008, p. 144) policies having as sole objective the inclusion in the labour market 
involve re-commodification and limit individuals’ autonomy (on the possibility to use 
autonomy as a normative framework for assessing welfare reform, see Bothfeld and 
Betzelt, 2013; Burchardt et al., 2013).  
4) For the social investment perspective, the first concern is social inclusion. From 
this perspective, the logic behind social inclusion is not that of equality or social 
justice but that of a ‘full utilization of society’s resources in the global competition’ 
(Joppke, 2012, p. 17) and to reduce the costs of social protection and welfare so that it 
seems that people must be included (Collins, 2003). Furthermore, the rhetoric of 
social inclusion ‘focuses the attention on a minimum threshold, from which 
“outsiders” must be helped, induced or forced to cross into mainstream, but it 
systematically ignores inequalities within that mainstream’ (Levitas, 2001, p. 456) 
and, in particular, the growing inequalities between the included in the labour 
market. 
In this way, while the social investment may be able of increasing GDP and 
employment rate, it may not be able to reduce poverty because – given that benefits 
are work-related – social investment policies are often regressive in redistribution 
terms (Cantillon, 2011).  
5) In any conception of social justice at the basis of the welfare state a crucial role 
is played by the beliefs about the causes of poverty and unemployment and about the 
deserving and undeserving poor (Ebert, 2012). “At the center of this model [the social 
investment] is the concept of ‘employability’ – the collection of worker characteristics 
that are increasingly seen as determinants of employment chances’ (Ibid, p. 731). 
Hence, unemployment is not a matter for public policy anymore but rather a 
microeconomic problem of finding the right incentive structure for activating the 
unemployed. “Employability, referring explicitly to individuals’ characteristics, 
implies that unemployment is the result of a personal failure and follows an economic 
rationale: ‘By seeking the reasons for long-term unemployment in the person of the 
unemployed worker, the rhetoric of employability injects individual responsibility 
into the reasoning behind social risk, although historically the latter was founded on 
doing away with the notion that the individual was at fault” (Zimmermann, 2006b, p. 
36-7). The main point here is that social investment policies aiming at improving 
individuals’ employability ‘cannot be expected to create jobs or to solve the 
macroeconomic problems of the economy.’ […] They would work ‘in the context of an 
expansionary, employment-creating macroeconomic policy’ (Peck and Theodore, 
2000, p. 741). However, in response to the crisis, the EU has adopted austerity 
measures, which has undermined the efficacy of the social investment strategy (Van 
Kersbergen and al., 2014), In conclusion, like the ordoliberal approach, the social 
investment one reduces the whole society into a ‘machinery of performance’ (Haahr, 
2004) while the role of the  state is reduced to providing a market-friendly 
environment. The idea behind this logic is that economic performance should be the 
only objective of politics and the only legitimate social goal. One can argued that 
among the social investment and ordoliberalism, despite the important differences at 
the policy level, there is a consensus on the most fundamental socioeconomic goals. 
Indeed, they both envision a state that ‘elevates the market over all else and adopts 
market logics to guide its own conduct’ (Brodie, 2007, p. 100).   
 
4. An alternative representation of Social Europe. 
  
The ordoliberal tradition with its key role in framing the institutions of the 
Economic and Monetary Union as well as in the formulation of the responses to the 
Eurozone crisis, has worsened the social situation in the Eurozone considerably. The 
social investment strategy, officially highlighted by the Commission as a social 
doctrine in response to the crisis, has offered no credible alternative to the austerity 
and retrenchment policy lead by the ordoliberal doctrine, because both approaches 
share the same doxa and look for solutions to the social crisis by reinforcing market 
mechanisms.  
Most propositions, made to reform Social Europe, concern the national level and 
remain compatible with the current logic of financialised capitalism. Even though at 
different degrees, they all either aimed at reinforcing the principles of benchmarking 
and at making selective cuts in the expanses, or at redesigning a dual social protection 
system as well as at implementing the logic of the workfare instead of the welfare. By 
lending top priority to the reduction of public and social spending, and by seeking the 
greatest flexibility of the labor market, they aim at defending those principles, which 
have much in common with the dominant doxa and the “structural reforms”, 
invariably advocated by the EU-institutions (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2008).  
Credible alternatives to the Social Europe call for another “Weltanschaung” which 
could rest on two main pillars: First, the market is not to be regarded as the exclusive 
aim of all human activities; second, a deeper degree of political integration at the 
European level is required. In other words, if we deliberately think at the European 
level and not at the state level (or at the level of individuals), two main areas of 
discussion may be considered: the harmonization of national social systems on the 
one hand, or a new set of priorities, which include the implementation of minimal 
social norms, on the other hand. The long term project of harmonizing the national 
social legislation has faced well-known obstacles since the Rome treaty: diversity of 
national welfare models, juridical issues and a too great disparity in levels of 
development between member states. Now, the financialised capitalism produces or 
at least reinforces these disparities by pushing national spaces and social systems in 
competition with each other, particularly in the Eurozone, where this competition has 
been organized and promoted. The aim of the harmonization of social systems is 
therefore incompatible with the functioning of a capitalism that is generating or 
reinforcing inequalities in the development between a "center" and a "periphery" of 
the Eurozone, as it has worked so far (Artus, 2013). 
Alternative representations of Social Europe need to conceive other principles of 
social justice and they have to call into question the dynamic of the financialised 
capitalism. First, in order to construct an alternative representation of Social Europe 
we refer here to Amartya Sen’s capability approach (CA). Indeed, this normative 
approach allows overcoming the ideologies that reduce people to human capital, 
making the case for an economy serving human beings rather than the opposite. 
Indeed, while for the social investment economic growth is the only political objective 
and legitimate social goal, for the CA, development is a ‘good social change’ (Crocker, 
1992, p. 585) assessed on ‘its human consequences’ (Lambert et al., 2012, p. 4). From 
this perspective, as Orton (2011) puts it, the CA ‘offers an alternative 
conceptualization of the very purpose of public policy, focusing on the shaping of the 
socio-economic context so as to enable citizens to have opportunities and freedom to 
choose what for them constitutes a flourishing life.’ (p. 358). Thus, from a CA 
perspective, it seems that individuals should enjoy some basic social rights 
 independently from their performance in the market. This would allow people to 
develop genuine preferences and to choose to work – and to choose a job that they 
have reasons to value – but also to engage in other valuable activities such as 
caregiving. In this sense, the CA supports a ‘life-first approach’ rather than a work-
first one (Dean, 2003). Also, individuals’ freedom and responsibility are not taken for 
granted – as in neoliberalism – but rather they are a political goal and the very 
purpose of public action. Indeed, if individual responsibility is assumed then the issue 
is one of bad will and the solution is searched in sanctions, tough conditionality and 
lower benefits. However, once responsibility is interpreted as the final goal of public 
action, it becomes a matter of creating the conditions for responsible behaviour 
helping people gaining autonomy (Bonvin and Farvaque, 2004). From this 
perspective, ‘the argument for social support in expanding people’s freedom can […] 
be seen as an argument for individual responsibility, not against it.’ In fact, ‘Without 
the substantive freedom and capacity to do something, a person cannot be 
responsible for doing it’ (Sen, 1999a, p. 284). In particular, ‘employability without 
employment does not make sense in a capabilities perspective’ (Orton, 2011, p. 357).  
Furthermore, what is needed is a re-interpretation of the meaning of work that ‘is 
not defined as a commodity, but as a valuable common good’ (Bonvin and Orton, 
2009, p. 572). Indeed, the CA ‘calls for redeployment of the problematic of human 
beings at work, viewing them as the final purpose of economic activity’ 
(Zimmermann, 2012, p. 21). Finally, the CA stresses the need for democratic 
participation (Sen, 1999a,b, 2009) instead of reducing welfare reform to a purely 
technical matter requiring technical solutions developed by experts in a top-down 
manner. 
Second, the essential logic of financialised capitalism consists, in our opinion, in 
the linkage of two main facts (Colletis, 2013). The first one is that the various factors 
of production (capital, skilled or unskilled labour) have different degree of mobility. 
While the capital displays – more than ever before – the highest speed of mobility, 
unskilled workers do not even move between countries, or if they do so, only in a 
context of precariousness or even clandestineness. The second fact, which 
characterizes financialised capitalism, is that remuneration of the factors of 
production depends on the speed of the factors mobility. The most mobile factor 
comes first and gets better paid. The linkage between these two facts does explain the 
nowadays very strong and fast growing income inequalities (Piketty, 2014). 
Therefore, in order to reinsert some social balancing, there is no other way than that 
to restrain the mobility of financial capital and to increase the mobility of labor as 
much as possible. We can here hardly present all available means to restrain the 
mobility of capital, yet we would still like to insist that one of the best means to 
increase worker mobility is that to secure an unprecedented investment in education 
and training of the work force. Workers are even more professionally mobile, (that) 
than they are well trained. 
From this view, there has been a central contradiction regarding the past and the 
current (social) situation of the European Union. Since the treaty of Rome, the 
European Union has always officially promoted the mobility of labour. Yet the EU and 
the member states have always been able to avoid a deeper social integration process 
(or even a harmonization of legislation), particularly because the mobility of labour 
between the member states has remained very weak19. However, the issue of mobility 
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 should not be understood only, or even mainly, in spatial terms but rather as a form 
of vocational mobility, as an ability to switch from one task to another. In this 
perspective, the labour forces should no longer be perceived merely as a cost, yet 
primarily as a source of wealth and innovation.  
If we look, against this background, for a different representation of the Social 
Europe issue, it needs to focus on and eventually concretely solve at least three key 
issues. The first one has to do with the type of federalism. The aim here should be to 
break with the current “market preserving federalism”. On the basis of the current 
institutional configuration and the veto power it gives to each member state in an 
enlarged and increasingly heterogeneous EU, only the use of the “enhanced 
cooperation” procedure (as displayed recently in the context of the implementation of 
a financial transaction tax) appears to be suitable for social issues. Yet it supposes 
new mechanisms of legitimization and democratic control.  
The second problem concerns the establishment of a new macroeconomic 
framework to put an end to the "social devaluation" at work in response to the euro 
crisis. The main measures should consist in postponing discretionary fiscal 
consolidation until demand is stronger, in using EU-level tools to protect countries 
from bond markets’ speculation and to promote economic growth, and in 
implementing a coordination of fiscal policy. On this basis, the third problem 
concerns the criteria of coordination in the field of labour law and social policy, as 
well as their extension onto the European level. Several propositions have already 
been made: a social scoreboard within the “European Semester” procedure, the 
reestablishment of an efficient Open Method of Coordination, the launching of a 
“European Social Stability Pact” and a renaissance of the Macroeconomic Dialogue. 
But a deeper social integration requires furthermore a new set of minimal norms, as 
well as new mechanisms of redistribution and of stabilization at the European level. 
The setting at the Eurozone level of a minimum wage and of minimum social benefits 
– set as a percentage of the median wage in each member state – should reduce the 
possibilities of social dumping (Trésor, 2014). Other propositions aim at 
implementing a (partial) unemployment insurance that might enable it to become a 
true embodiment of social Europe, while at the same time strengthening the 
macroeconomic stabilization process of the Eurozone as a whole (Dulien, 2013). To 
restructure the eurozone, EU social policy need to be strengthened considerably: not 
only because it’s the best way to re-legitimize the European integration, but also 
because ambitious social policies are necessary to secure effective convergence of 
economic performance within the monetary union (Grahl and Teague, 2013). 
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 Annex - From Messina to Maastricht: The ordoliberal imprint. 
 
The European integration is without doubt the result of several compromises 
between member states with divergent interests (Moravsick, 1998) and between 
rival ideological orientations, notably concerning the institutional architecture of the 
EU. Nevertheless the ordolibérale imprint is the most important as shown by the 
negotiations and the content of the treaties of Rome and Maasticht: “ordoliberalism 
has represented the genuine ideological matrix of the European institutions” (Strassl, 
2000, p.3). 
 
Impact of Ordoliberalism on the Treaty of Rome 
 
Advocates of ordoliberalism, like Ludwig Erhard himself, exercised a tremendous 
influence during the constitutional phase of the Federal Republic of Germany, and, 
more precisely, in 1949, when the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) adopted this 
doctrine. At that time, two issues were on the political agenda: the completion of the 
political order and the European issue. As a result, advocates of ordoliberalism have 
been closely associated with the building of Europe, giving it the imprint of their 
school of thoughts. In his capacity as head of the department for fundamental issues 
at the Federal Ministry of Economics, Alfred Müller-Armack had a pivotal influence in 
the two political fields (Breker 2002, p. 113), whereas Ludwig Erhard, who was the 
Minister of Economics, was the one bearing political responsibility.  
The European issue came back on the agenda when Robert Schuman tabled his 
proposal in May 1950. Negotiations leading to the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC Treaty) were taking place at that time and France still assumed a leading 
position compared to Germany. The latter was mainly concerned with negotiating its 
readmission into the European community of nations (Bilger 1998). This is the 
reason why the ECSC was established under the auspices of Jean Monnet and Konrad 
Adenauer, though economic circles, including Erhard, showed a strong reluctance to 
engage on this path. Erhard finally joined in, taking into consideration competition 
clauses (articles 60 and 61). Considering the ECSC, ordoliberals such as Wilhelm 
Röpke and Erhard saw the imprint of French dirigisme, planned economy and 
protectionism whereas they considered European integration as the first step 
towards the establishment of a global free-trade zone. After the failure of the 
European Political Community (Vayssiere 2005) and the European Defence 
Community (EDC), negotiations in which Müller-Armack had taken part as the 
representative of the Ministry for Economics, as it was the case for all negotiations 
that led to the Treaty of Rome, paved the way for economic integration on the bases 
of the propositions tabled by the Spaak’s committee in April 1955. The Treaties of 
Rome actually are the products of a twofold compromise: within the German 
government on the one hand and between France and Germany on the other (Laval, 
2006; Drexl, 2011). 
The preparatory process for the negotiations was led by the Ministry of 
Economics; it involved various expert panels and required some exhaustive work on 
issues and strategies (von der Groeben 1979). Müller-Armarck worked on behalf of 
the German government on a common position based on the compromise hammered 
out at Eicherscheid between the federalist faction and ordoliberal one. This led to an 
approach to European integration according to which the next stages would be the 
 implementation of sectoral policies (European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or 
Euratom) as a concession to France under the leadership of Monnet) and the 
establishment of a common market, including the free circulation of goods, service 
and capital as well as currency convertibility (the second scheme most in line with 
German interests). In his “Considerations on the issue of cooperation versus 
integration”, Erhard wrote in May 1955 that Europe should aim at functional 
integration, i.e. on larger scale trade liberation of goods and capitals, currency 
convertibility, excluding the creation of new institutions (Laval 2006, p. 17). This 
compromise would serve as the basis for the Messina conference. Then came the 
French-German compromise: during the negotiations leading to Treaties of Rome, the 
starting point of which was the Spaak’s report which was a strong advocate of 
supranational integration, the French government put again forward proposals for a 
supranational organisation accompanied by common sectoral policies (e.g. on 
agriculture, transport) and a market protected by high external tariffs. Germany, 
which for the first time participated as a free and equal partner (von der Groeben 
1979, p. 496) in the negotiations, strongly rejected the sectoral approach which it 
deemed too “dirigiste” (Moravcsik 1998, p. 140) and advocated the adoption at 
European level of the principle of competitive, open, market economy (Bilder 1998). 
In the institutional fields, German liberals opposed the proposals included in the 
Spaak’s report, by fear of dirigisme. Under the instruction of Erhard, Müller-Armarck, 
seconded by the French, succeeded in watering down the powers of the European 
Commission, which were limited to tabling proposals, to the benefit of the Council of 
the Ministers (Council of the European Union). The ordoliberal approach prevailed in 
the architecture of the Treaty of Rome: the German Minister of Economics succeeded 
in imposing his views on market liberation without previous fiscal and social 
harmonisation 20  as well as precise and constraining rules on competition 
commitments in favour of a liberal policy. “This influence can mainly be explained by 
the hierarchical framework in which objectives are ordered and the relations 
between the clear legal instruments provided by the Treaty and these objectives” 
(Drexl 2011, p. 437) – and these instruments have hardly been modified since then. 
At the top level appear the several objectives, which are operationalized at the 
intermediate level, that is in Article 3 on the policies to be implemented by the 
Community (ibid.): it included the establishment of a European internal market – the 
four main liberties and “undistorted” competition – and since the Maastricht Treaty, 
the Economic and Monetary Union. At a lower level, what prevailed were operational 
rules for the establishment of the European internal market and competition policy.  
“During all phases of negotiations the essential principles of a market-oriented 
system were successfully put forward and embodied in the EEC treaty. This has 
occasionally been denied because the Treaty does not contain expressis verbis any 
paragraph concerning the economic order. However, if we consider the totality of the 
                                        
20  „In exchange for accepting an industrial customs union, the French government forwarded the demands 
of the Patronat – prior harmonization of social regulations concerning the length of paid vacation, gender 
equality of wages and the workweek, the right to withdraw of veto continuation to the ‚second stage‘ after 
the first 25 percent tariff cut, the right to invoke clauses and impose border taxes in the case of a balance 
of payment crisis – plus an agriculture policy. (…) By late October 1956 (…) France renounced the right 
to withdraw unilaterally and conceded that social policy might be harmonized at the beginning of the 
second stage, but reasserted its positions on safeguards and the veto. Erhard, apparently seeking to block 
the EC and mobilize German business behind the Free Trade Agreement, rejected the compromise” 
(Moravcsik, 1998, p. 144). 
 goals specified in the treaty and the rules and institutions for their realization, it 
clearly appears that they not only contain all essential characteristics of a market-
oriented system but also include rules that considerably limit the freedom of 
intervention of member states” (von der Groeben 1979, p. 497): abolition of all 
impediments to trade and the free movement of the production factors and goods, 
European rules about effective competition and against discrimination, the freedom 
to establish a business, free access to any market, etc. In addition, in view of the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, it can be said that 
the ordoliberal approach has shown a remarkable level of continuity and resilience, 
also against recent economic theories (Drexl 2011). The legacy of the ordoliberalism 
in the field of the European competition policy has been meanwhile broadly 
acknowledged (Denord, 2008).  
In this context, what was the role assigned to the European Community in the 
social field? In the framework of a global approach conformed with the principle of 
subsidiarity, social and redistribution policies still remain the responsibilities of the 
Members States. The guiding thought (Art. 117 of the Treaty of Rome) was that social 
progress, viewed as the “harmonisation of social systems”, could be heralded as the 
result of the “good functioning of the market” and to a lesser extent to the 
“procedures included in the treaty”. This constitutes the “dichotomy” between the 
social dimension which remains an area determined by the national legal framework, 
on the one hand, and the establishment of the European free trade system (Joerges 
2005, p.18), on the other: The two processes shift away from each other, very much in 
accordance with the wishes of the liberals.  
 
Ordoliberalism and Maastricht 
 
In the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Maastricht, Germany was not willing to 
agree to any sharing of monetary sovereignty under the EMU, unless this would be 
deeply rooted in an institutional framework in which “governing rules” would prevail 
without encroaching on the independence and the mandate of the European Central 
Bank (ECB). This construct was seen as a way to avoid any discretionary political 
choices at European level and redistribution mechanisms between member states.  
Even before the fall of the Berlin wall and the debate on the anchorage of reunited 
Germany in the European Union (EU), the issue at stake for the successive 
governments of the Deutschmark zone and first and foremost for the French 
government was to put an end to the asymmetric functioning of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) and to the hegemony of the Budesbank. The Bundesbank 
policy, which was logically defined within the scope of the German context only, 
meant that the central banks of the other EMS member states, a fortiori with a view to 
create free markets for capitals, had to conform to the policy of the Bundesbank in 
order to defend their currency against the Deutsche Mark – according to the 
incompatibility triangle of Mundell. This had a major influence on Germany’s options 
on the path to the future treaty which itself is the result of a compromise between the 
Bundesbank anti-inflation policy, and the demands of German business interests and 
the Chancellery for a competitive exchange rate and macroeconomic simulation 
(Moravcsik 1998). Therefore, as soon as 1988, the German government agreed to 
share German monetary sovereignty while imposing binding rules based on 
institutional ordoliberal principals and “new classical macroeconomics”.  
 Deeply influential in the Delors report, the “fundamentalist approach” of the 
Bundesbank which was advocated by Karl-Otto Pöhl had paved the way for such a 
development. The characteristics of the “Economic Union” in conjunction with the 
Monetary Union have endowed the unrestricted common market with a set of rules 
that are indispensable to its proper working. In this sense, the Economic Union can be 
described as being based on four basic elements: the single market within which 
persons, goods, services and capital can move freely; competition policy and other 
measures aimed at strengthening market mechanisms; common policies designed to 
foster structural change and regional development; and finally, macroeconomic 
policy coordination, including binding rules for budgetary policies (Delors report, p. 
16). Relying on its dominant position in the negotiation process and appearing as the 
negotiation partner endowed with the greater asset and who could therefore suffer 
the greatest loss, Germany was successful in making its views prevail in the majority 
of the key issues: (1) the right to opt out, (2) nominal “convergence“ criteria for 
participation, (3) the schedule and procedure for the transmission to EMU, (4) the 
nature of transitional or “second-stage“ institutions such as the European Monetary 
Institute, (5) the autonomy, mandate and voting procedures of the ECB, (6) the site of 
the ECB and the name of the currency, (7) controls and sanctions on excessive 
national deficits, and (8) provisions for bailouts and other financial transfers  
(Moravcsik 1998, pp. 441-442). The strongest initiatives came from the most 
interested country, France, and Germany was in the position to impose conditions. 
Several factors contributed to this: “the German government’s structural power, 
which in turn resulted from a relatively attractive alternative to the agreement 
(Moravcsik 1998, p. 466), the sheer size of Germany and the Deutsche Mark and the 
unique federal structure of the Bundesbank; strong theoretical support, based on a 
blend of German ordoliberal and mainstream Anglo-Saxon ideas; the successful story 
of German monetary policy (Maes 2002, p. 25).  
Based on “binding rules” and born out of it, the institutional framework of EMU is 
aimed at subjecting the functioning of the Eurozone to the inflation target defined by 
the European Central Bank, the constitution of which were inspired by the 
Bundesbank mode (Strassl 2009). In order for this objective to be “credible”, the ECB 
must be independent and granted a quasi-exclusive mandate. However, economic 
growth remains an objective that is subordinated to price stability and the ECB has no 
mandate in relation to monitoring financial markets. In addition to the Maastricht 
criteria, which were later anchored in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), national 
budget policies are meant to be limited to the role of a shock absorber to smooth out 
conjunctural fluctuations. The sanction mechanisms are meant to ensure that 
discretionary spending policy in the member states will not damage the objectives of 
the ECB. The interdiction made to the ECB to monetarise sovereign debt and the no 
bailout clause between member states in the case of crises of solvability affecting one 
of them, contribute to the same finality: they aimed at prohibiting moral hazard 
behaviours from member states prone to “overspending”. As a result of the existence 
of such a regulatory framework, there should be no need of a political body in charge 
of defining the optimal policy mix, i.e. the optimal combination of monetary and fiscal 
policies, and coordinating the latter according to the economic context in the whole 
zone and in the various countries. Based on a monetary policy targeting a low 
inflation rate (2%) and budgetary policies that must remain neutral throughout an 
economic cycle, growth and employment are expected to be the outcome of 
“structural reforms”. The prerequisites are deregulation of the product and job 
 markets as well as labour costs, with a view to enhancing competitiveness. With the 
Agenda 2010, successive governments and companies have drawn all the 
consequences of this new context. 
The influence of German ordoliberalism has been overwhelming in the emergence 
of EMU and focussed on competition policy and monetary stability as central pieces of 
the treaties. Nevertheless, compared to the German federal system, two important 
components are missing (Laval 2006): a central budgetary policy to ensure 
stabilisation and redistribution and fiscal transfers between states. This architecture, 
which tends to “market making federalism” is highly problematic for national social 
models (Barbier 2012). 
